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transcriptional regulation of clock genes in Cyanobacte-
ria is unnecessary, since 24 hr rhythms in KaiC phos-
phorylation can be observed for at least 3 days when pu-
rified KaiA, KaiB, and KaiC are mixed together in a test
tube (Nakajima et al., 2005).
However, before we conclude that any supposed
‘‘core clock gene’’ is dispensable, we should remember
that none of these ‘‘clocks’’ in a null mutant genetic
background is truly accurate—the clocks of Clock2/2
mutant mice run short and display light-resetting de-
fects. Even so, it is difficult to reconcile the findings of
De Bruyne et al. with further evidence of the importance
of mammalian CLOCK reported in the current issue of
Cell. Doi et al. (2006) found that the CLOCK carboxy ter-
minus possesses histone acetyltransferase (HAT) activ-
ity, which is important since histone acetylation was pre-
viously shown to contribute to the activation of genes
controlled by CLOCK/BMAL1. Doi et al. found that the
HAT activity of CLOCK is essential for circadian regula-
tion, as rhythms in mouse embryonic fibroblasts from
ClockD19/D19 mice can be rescued by full-length CLOCK
but not by HAT-deficient CLOCK. Thus, it is even more
surprising thatClock2/2mice show strong rhythms. Pre-
sumably there is another circadian HAT, but it seems un-
likely that NPAS2 fulfills this function, as the homology
to CLOCK is low at the carboxy terminus.
The redundancy that allows rhythms in the absence
of CLOCK may reflect the underlying complexity of the
molecular clock itself. Many clock proteins are posttran-
scriptionally regulated to control their rates of accumu-
lation, nuclear entry, and degradation. This presumably
allows clocks to keep track of time even when genes are
constitutively expressed or expressed with a lower am-
plitude than normal—as long as they are expressed to
some degree. Rhythms in the absence of CLOCK could
also arise from the clock network formed by intracellular
interactions between pacemaker cells in the SCN. Ani-
mal behavior requires so many genes to be regulated
in different ways at different times of the day in different
tissues that an intracellular feedback loop with a minimal
number of core factors is simply not up to the task.
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Recent evidence has challenged the view that memo-
ries are made permanent by a consolidation process
that happens just once and instead have suggested
that memories are ‘‘reconsolidated’’ after reminders.
The current findings of Morris et al. in this issue of
Neuron suggest that reconsolidation may involve a
complex interaction between synaptic andsystempro-
cessing of recent as well as remote experiences.
Brain insults can result in amnesia for recent events but
has less effect on memories that have had time to ma-
ture. The common observation of temporally graded ret-
rograde amnesia has led to the prevalent hypothesis
that memories undergo consolidation, an extended pro-
cess through which memories become more perma-
nent. But we are woefully ignorant about what goes on
in the brain during this shadowy afterlife of experiences.
We do know that there are two distinct types of consol-
idation: a modification of synaptic efficacy that is char-
acterized by molecular events and a system integration
that involves interplay between the hippocampus and
cortical areas (Dudai, 2004).
Historically, the view has been that each process,
once begun, normally runs its course to a completion
without further influence. Now we know this idea is too
simplistic. Recent observations have suggested that
synaptic consolidation can be reinitiated by reminders
(Przybyslawski and Sara, 1997; Nader et al., 2000). In
these experiments, sufficient time after a learning expe-
rience was allowed for synaptic consolidation to com-
plete. Then, when given a reminder of the task, the sub-
ject’s memory became again susceptible to disruption
by an agent that blocks synaptic consolidation. The in-
terpretation was that the reminder initiates ‘‘reconsoli-
dation,’’ a recapitulation of synaptic consolidation pro-
cesses. Many expressed skepticism about how the
molecular events in synaptic consolidation could be re-
versed (Dudai, 2004), but the phenomenon has been
replicated and extended, reassuring us that whatever
the susceptibility after reminders is, it is a real phenom-
enon that requires an explanation.
Our understanding of system consolidation has also
evolved. The standard notion is that the hippocampus
initially encodes a new experience by linking corti-
cal representations, and then repetitive iterations of
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351Figure 1. A Speculative Model of Consolida-
tion and Reconsolidation
Pictured are representations of the course
of system consolidation (A–C) of a newly ac-
quired associative memory (green squares),
stored initially in the hippocampus (small
box) and subsequently interleaved within a
pre-existing memory network (white circles)
in the cortex (large box). A disruption of this
process occurs when the synaptic consolida-
tion of a representation of a newly stored re-
minder is blocked (D). This may prevent the
interleaving process, sending incomplete in-
formation to the cortex that corrupts the pre-
existing memory network without storing the
new memory (E).cortical-hippocampal-cortical interaction strengthen in-
tracortical connections (Squire and Alvarez, 1995).
Eventually, the cortical areas become sufficiently con-
nected so that retrieving all the elements of memory
no longer requires the assistance of the hippocampus.
This notion was elaborated by McClelland et al. (1995)
who argued that focused strengthening of new connec-
tions in a cortex that contains related memories would
corrupt the pre-existing memory network, resulting in
‘‘catastrophic interference’’ of the older memories.
They proposed an influential model in which new repre-
sentations are rapidly formed in the hippocampus, not in
the cortex. Subsequently the hippocampus replays
those memories repeatedly into a cortex that also fre-
quently re-experiences through daily life aspects of its
previously stored memories. Through numerous itera-
tions of new and old memory replays, the cortical net-
work gradually changes to interleave the new informa-
tion within the network such that the revised network
supports both the new and old memories.
The fundamental tenet of hippocampal-cortical inter-
play has been supported by recent studies revealing
complementary activation patterns during retrieval at
different points in the consolidation process, such that
the hippocampus, and not the cortex, is activated dur-
ing retrieval shortly after learning, whereas the reverse
pattern, cortical and not hippocampal activation, is ob-
served as consolidation is completed (Frankland et al.,
2004; Ross and Eichenbaum, 2006). These findings sup-
port the notion that the cortex depends on inputs from
early-established memories in the hippocampus to form
a long-term representation that ultimately guides re-
membering. In addition, recent evidence indicates that
reconsolidation also occurs at the system level. Debiec
et al. (2002) showed that a reminder presented after
consolidation of a hippocampal-dependent memory is
completed can reinitiate susceptibility to hippocampal
damage. This finding begs the question of what role re-
minders play in the interleaving of hippocampal memo-
ries into the cortical network.
The findings of Morris et al. (2006) in this issue of
Neuron suggest the possibility that reconsolidation re-
flects an interaction between synaptic and system con-
solidations. Morris and his colleagues studied reconso-
lidation in two variations of the water maze task. In the
standard task, rats were trained over multiple days to
find an escape platform in the same place each day. In
the delayed matching to place (DMP) version of thetask, the platform locus was changed every day, requir-
ing rats to learn a new platform position within each ses-
sion. After equivalent training on one of these tasks, rats
were then allowed to swim in the maze without escape
(the reminder) and then treated with a pharmacological
blocker of synaptic consolidation (anisomycin) or pla-
cebo. In subsequent testing, the performance of rats
trained on the standard task was not disrupted by the
reminder-treatment combination, indicating reconsoli-
dation was not invoked for a well-established memory.
However, the performance of rats trained in the DMP
task fell to chance, lower than if they had merely forgot-
ten the most recent escape locus. This observation indi-
cates the treatment had prevented expression of the
memories established even before the learning the most
recent escape locus, therefore suggesting reconsolida-
tion normally occurs in the DMP protocol.
The authors concluded that ‘‘engagement of a memory-
encoding mode during spatial memory retrieval may be
a requirement for reconsolidation to be observed.’’ Nota-
bly, this new encoding happens precisely when one
would expect that the hippocampal-cortical system is in-
terleaving the new information into the existing network
of previous experiences in the maze. So, could there be
a connection between synaptic and system processes
that accounts for reconsolidation in this paradigm? For
the DMP task, the McClelland et al., (1995) model would
predict that the most recent experience is initially en-
coded into the hippocampus, whereas the cortex con-
tains a network of memories for the structure of the
maze, task rules, and knowledge about previous plat-
form locations (Figure 1A). Then, during system consoli-
dation, the new specific information is normally inter-
leaved within the established cortical network over an
extended period (Figure 1B) (Remondes and Schuman,
2004; Winocur et al., 2005). At completion, a representa-
tion of the newest platform position is fit into the cortical
network among modifications of the pre-existing repre-
sentations (Figure 1C).
A treatment-induced block of synaptic consolidation
of the hippocampal representation might be expected
to cut short the interleaving process (Figure 1D). What
does the cortex do in this situation? It could just remain
unmodified, maintaining the representation of the task
with an older learned platform location. But this is not
what Morris et al. observed. Instead, perhaps a selective
disruption of the updating information renders the
cortical network more susceptible to catastrophic
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352interference from the new experience when it cannot
benefit from multiple iterations of the new information
that should be coming from the hippocampus. Thus,
what does get to the cortex corrupts the old information
without overwriting or interleaving a new representation
that would support memory expression (Figure 1E).
This account of Morris and colleagues’ findings is
speculative, but it does incorporate the observation of
reconsolidation at both the synaptic and system level.
Additional recent findings also support the suggestion
that reconsolidation involves alterations in the network
representation and its dynamics. Whether reconsolida-
tion occurs depends on the strength of the memory
and the time since its formation (Berman and Dudai,
2001; Milekic and Alberini, 2002; Suzuki et al., 2004).
Also, instead of blocking reconsolidation, sometimes
a reminder event acts as an extinction trial, whose con-
solidation is prevented by blocking agents, resulting in
the reminder-plus-treatment animals exhibiting stronger
memory for the initial learning than control subjects, the
opposite of the expected result of blocking reconsolida-
tion. Most compelling is the finding that if the consolida-
tion blocking treatment is applied before extinction is
complete, the original association is inhibited (indicating
reconsolidation), whereas if the same treatment is applied
in a later retrieval session, the extinction is impaired
(Eisenberg et al., 2003). These findings, combined with
the current observations by Morris et al., support the no-
tion that every new experience, whether it is new learn-
ing or a reminder of past events, must be interleaved
with the pre-existing knowledge structure. Mucking with
the persistence of the new representation may lead the
network into a state of catastrophic interference rather
than interleaving, leaving the animal at a loss.
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